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Philosophers have long been interested in a series of interrelated questions about natural kinds. What are 
they? What role do they play in science and metaphysics? How do they contribute to our epistemic projects? 
What categories count as natural kinds? And so on. Owing, perhaps, to different starting points and 
emphases, we now have at hand a variety of conceptions of natural kinds—some apparently better suited than 
others to accommodate a particular sort of inquiry. Even if coherent, this situation isn’t ideal. My goal in this 
paper is to begin to articulate a more general account of “natural kind phenomena”. While I do not claim that 
this account should satisfy everyone—it is built around a certain conception of the epistemic role of kinds and 
has a certain obvious pragmatic flavor—I believe that it has the resources to go further than extant 
alternatives, in particular the Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) view of kinds. 
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1 Introduction 
Many metaphysicians and philosophers of science have puzzled over whether our best theories can 
reasonably taken to “carve nature at its joints”. A common way of approaching this metaphorical 
question has been to ask first what Ian Hacking has called a “gentle metaphysical question”: “are 
there natural kinds—real or true kinds found in or made by nature?” (Hacking [1990], p. 135). 
Though one could fret about the exact formulation of this question, it seems a reasonable first stab: 
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A realist should have to lay down a general metaphysical conception of natural kinds before going on 
to assess our theories’ success at attuning our categories to them. Call this the Realist Presumption.  
 One obvious difficulty with the Realist Presumption is that it often seems to put the cart before 
the horse. Certain metaphysical accounts of natural kinds might entail that categories widely used in 
a particular science cannot, in fact, count as natural kinds. Whether we interpret this as a problem or 
as a result depends on our prior commitments. Categories within the biological sciences, for 
example, have been particularly contentious. What we might call “traditional” conceptions of natural 
kinds,1 developed initially with pristine examples from physics and chemistry in mind, accommodate 
unruly biological categories rather poorly. Some of these problems are empirical: biological species, 
for example, appear not to have any intrinsic properties which are fit candidates for being essences 
(cf. Devitt [2008]; Wilkerson [1995]). Other problems are philosophical: even if there were 
properties that all and only members of a particular taxon possessed, it’s unclear that we should 
rightly count them as that taxon’s essence. Yet the thesis that many such biological categories do, in 
some sense, “carve nature at the joints” cannot be abandoned lightly. For these categories play 
important roles in our epistemic practices (in and out of science); we often treat them as objects of 
discovery rather than merely pragmatic, contingent reflections of how it suits us to portion some 
homogenous metaphysical pudding.  
 Realism about species, of course, can be defended via alternative means. And indeed, Ghiselin 
and Hull’s Species-as-Individuals thesis (Ghiselin [1974]; Hull [1978]) currently enjoys broad 
support from both philosophers and biologists. But even if this is the right metaphysic for species,2 it 
offers little consolation for those seeking an account of realism about biological categories generally. 
It wasn’t meant to. Nor do I see any plausible, non-trivial way of extending the individualist 
metaphysic to such biological categories as genes, proteins, cells, tissues, organ systems, races, 
ecosystems, and so on (cf. Wilson [2005], p. 99; Wilson, Barker, & Brigandt [2007], p. 194); ditto 
traditional accounts of natural kinds.  
 It’s for these reasons that Richard Boyd’s ([1988], [1991], [1999]) Homeostatic Property Cluster 
(HPC) account of natural kinds has been enthusiastically received—particularly among philosophers 
of biology who feel the sting of essentialism’s failure the most poignantly. Though many have 
worked to fill in the details of the account (Chakravartty [2007]; Griffiths [1997], [1999]; Kornblith 
[1993]; Wilson [1999], [2005]; Wilson, et al. [2007]), several worries and open questions about the 
account remain (see, e.g., Ereshefsky [2010]; Ereshefsky & Matthen [2005]). Not all of these 
purported problems are actual, in my view. I won’t be able to argue for this in the present paper, 
however. Instead, I focus on concerns involving the HPC account’s reliance on the idea of causal 
homeostatic mechanisms. In brief: while it may often make sense for us to describe our classificatory 
activities in terms of our seeking out causal mechanisms underlying natural kind phenomena, 
                                                
1 By which I have in mind accounts which construe natural kinds as individuated by intrinsic essences. 
2 I am skeptical; see my ([2014]) 
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making causal mechanism the focus of our account of natural kinds unduly restricts the application 
of HPC theory. I will argue that such mechanisms are neither necessary nor sufficient to underpin 
these activities.  
 Happily, considering these problems leads the way to a more general and flexible account of 
natural kinds. I propose that we drop the emphasis on mechanism and instead focus on what 
mechanisms were supposed to offer to a cluster of properties: a certain kind of cohesiveness or 
stability. In virtue of this change of emphasis, my account does not advertise itself as an account of a 
kind of natural kind—it is, I think, an attractive candidate for a general natural kind concept, able to 
accommodate the diversity of natural kinds we find in the world.  
 Is this a major or minor revision I am proposing? Insofar as homeostatic properties were 
supposed to play a major role in the HPC account, dropping them can seem a major change and 
leaves a rather gaping theoretical hole. To plug this hole, at least as a starting point, I’ll offer a 
characterization of the kind of stability that I argue unites the clusters of properties which are natural 
kinds. Yet in other ways, I am proposing a rather minor revision to HPC—one which I hope will be 
sympathetically received by advocates of HPC. For one, there is a sense in which the stability I am 
proposing to make central to the account was already implicitly in view and that a shift of focus and 
further articulation is all that is required. For two, the account I offer clearly works within Boyd’s 
general cluster framework for understanding how natural kind phenomena integrate into our 
epistemic practices. At the end of the day, however, I have no significant interest in settling the issue 
of whether the account I sketch in this paper amounts to a novel theory of natural kinds or a major 
or minor revision to HPC. For convenience’s sake, let us give it a name nevertheless: the Stable 
Property Cluster (SPC) account of natural kinds.  
 Here is the plan of the paper: I will begin by briefly motivating the cluster approach to natural 
kinds, describing how it fell initially to the neo-essentialism of Kripke and Putnam but was later 
reinvigorated by Boyd (§2). Because previous discussion of neo-essentialism tended to focus on the 
exciting semantic and metaphysical theses Kripke and Putnam proposed—some thought it a 
resurrection of Aristotelian essentialism—the affinity between essentialist kinds and HPC kinds is 
sometimes under-appreciated. But the accounts share important common ground on the specific 
role of natural kinds in our inferential practices and how their metaphysics suits them to this role 
(§3). After describing my worries about the HPC account’s invocation of causal mechanisms (§4), I 
outline a conception of stability for property cluster kinds (§5) and explore the ways in which the 
SPC account of natural kinds supports and undercuts the Realist Presumption (§6). My final 
suggestion will be that we need an account not of natural kinds per se—not a detailed answer to 
Hacking’s Gentle Metaphysical Question—but an account of “natural kindness”: a kind of status 
things can have that partially underpins their role in our inferential practices. 
 
2 The Fall and Rise of Cluster Kind Concepts 
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Recall that cluster accounts of reference were seen as an improvement on what Putnam called the 
“traditional view” according to which the meaning of kind terms is given by a conjunction of 
properties (Putnam [1975], p. 140). Whereas Descriptivism famously encountered trouble when it 
came to the modal and epistemological status of these properties, cluster accounts seemed to fare 
better on this count (Searle [1958], p. 160). Relaxing the requirement that all of the descriptive 
properties be possessed by the bearer of a particular proper name, the proponents of cluster accounts 
allowed that a name might be associated only with a cluster of descriptions none of which were 
necessary for successful reference. However, as Kripke ([1980]) argued rather convincingly, it seems 
that we can successfully refer to, say, Aristotle even if we are dramatically misinformed about his 
accomplishments. Even the loose, cluster variety of Descriptivism seems to conflict with compelling 
modal/semantic intuitions that Kripke saw as motivating the causal theory of reference.3  
 The popularity of Kripke and Putnam’s “neo-essentialism” about natural kinds stemmed partly 
from their success in translating these intuitions about the semantics of proper names to natural kind 
terms. Cluster accounts of kind-membership look like they’d face analogous difficulties. Might not 
we just be mistaken that a certain kind of stuff is correctly described by even a cluster of properties? 
Perhaps. But the tenability of this possibility turns on the intuition that we can, as it were, keep our 
finger on the misrepresented stuff in different circumstances (across possible worlds, and so on)—in 
other words: that there is some underlying essence of what it is to be stuff of this kind. When it 
becomes difficult to maintain this intuition, the temptation to abandon the cluster approach tends to 
diminish.  
 The essentialist intuition—whatever the status of its application to specific cases—has two main 
features. One is a claim about the semantic role of essences just mentioned: that when we refer to 
kinds, we do not refer to things possessing the superficial properties which might normally be taken 
to describe the kind, but to things possessing a “deeper” level of similarity. Another claim has a 
metaphysical-explanatory character and is arguably more central to essentialist kinds’ putative role in 
science. Essences explain why properties “clump” together. The properties commonly associated, but 
not definitive, of a kind—its “nominal essence”—are the effects of a common cause: the 
instantiation of its “real essence”.  
 The existence of natural kind essences would thus explain not only why cluster accounts of kinds 
would have been tempting in the first place, but why such clusters were not ephemeral, accidental 
features of the world. This, in turn, helps explain why kinds often seem to play a role in explanation 
and inference. Were the clustering of a bunch of properties associated with a kind a mere accident, 
inferring that a certain object had some of those properties from the fact that it was of a particular 
kind would be unreliable. Likewise, such accidents would be devoid of explanatory force.  
 The essentialist explanation of clustering is so good—and apparently so prevalent (in certain 
domains, anyway)—that it is tempting to suppose that it is the only possible explanation. Devitt 
                                                
3 Not that those intuitions necessitated such a theory, of course. 
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seems to express this attitude in his argument for intrinsic biological essentialism. The law-like truth 
of generalizations about biological taxa (such as ‘Indian rhinos have two horns’) demands 
explanation: “There has to be something about the very nature of the group . . . that, given its 
environment, determines the truth of the generalization. That something is an intrinsic underlying, 
probably largely genetic, property that is part of the essence of the group. Indeed, what else could it 
be?” ([2008], p. 352). But why suppose that there is any one explanation for property clustering, 
much less that it is the existence of essential properties attaching to the kind?4 
 What seems clear is the truth of essentialism’s explanandum: The world exhibits a lot of property 
clustering. As Anjan Chakravartty puts it: 
Properties, or property instances, are not the sorts of things that come randomly 
distributed across space-time. They are systematically “sociable” in various ways. 
They “like” each other’s company. The highest degree of sociability is evidenced by 
essence kinds, where specific sets of properties are always found together. In other 
cases, lesser degrees of sociability are evidenced by the somewhat looser associations 
that make up cluster kinds. In either case, it is the fact that members of kinds share 
properties, to whatever degree, that underwrites the inductive generalizations and 
predictions to which these categories lend themselves. (Chakravartty [2007], p. 170) 
Essences explain one end of the spectrum of property “sociability” phenomena. But what, if 
anything, accounts for the looser societies of properties?  
 Here’s where Boyd’s HPC account of natural kinds apparently shines. He writes: 
I argue that there are a number of scientifically important kinds (properties, relations, 
etc.) whose natural definitions are very much like the property-cluster definitions 
postulated by ordinary-language philosophers except that the unity of the properties 
in the defining cluster is mainly causal rather than conceptual. The natural definition 
of one of these homeostatic property cluster kinds is determined by the members of a 
cluster of often co-occurring properties and by the (“homeostatic”) mechanisms that 
bring about their co-occurrence. (Boyd [1991], p. 141) 
By emphasizing the role of causally-sustained sociability, the HPC account purports to solve a 
“Goldilocks” problem for natural kinds: explaining both the “non-accidentality” of some property 
clustering and the manner in which even such clustering can nevertheless be imperfect. This 
imperfection in turns accords just the sort of flexibility that allows the HPC account to make sense 
                                                
4 Devitt seems to hold open the possibility that homeostatic property clusters might count as essences ([2008], pp. 350–
1). 
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of our classificatory practices in domains (such as biology) that have proved challenging to the 
essentialist.5  
 We will circle back to consider the role of homeostatic mechanisms for the HPC account 
shortly. First, it is worth asking after its intended breadth. Is Boyd offering us a general account of 
natural kinds or something more specialized? It’s sometimes difficult to tell. Like Chakravartty, 
Hilary Kornblith—an early advocate of the HPC view—describes the view in general terms: 
“Natural kinds involve causally stable combinations of properties residing together in an intimate 
relationship” ([1993], p. 7). On the other hand, Boyd’s above description suggests a more 
circumscribed intent.6 Wilson, Barker, and Brigandt take the cue; in their discussion of stem cells, 
they list a number of characteristics typically possessed by stem cells, noting that “there are 
exceptions, so that the above describes a genuine HPC kind” ([2007], p. 218). This makes it sound 
as if rather than HPC kinds tolerating the non-instantiation of some of a cluster’s properties in a 
member of the kind it characterizes, such lapses were in fact required for that kind to be one of the 
scruffy yet hip HPC underground.7  
 Whatever Boyd and company’s intent, it seems doubtful that the HPC account can 
straightforwardly serve as a general account of natural kinds—for two (nested) reasons. First, it seems 
quite odd to think of essences as homeostatic mechanisms (in anything but a dramatically weakened 
sense) maintaining the stability of a cluster of properties. Suppose the essentialists are right that the 
essence of water is having the molecular structure commonly denoted ‘H2O’: it’s in virtue of having 
this structure that something is a water molecule with all the superficial properties associated with 
that kind. In what sense, however, is that structure also a causal mechanism? Such essences clearly fall 
short of even very general accounts of mechanism on the market (such as those of Bechtel [2006]; 
Machamer, Darden, & Craver [2000]; Woodward [2002]). Second, some natural kinds are not 
plausibly thought of as being defined by causally-united properties at all. The elementary particles, 
for example, appear to be individuated by perfectly-maintained suites of properties, none of which 
are derivative from any others. Perhaps it is simply a fundamental law that an up quark has a spin of 
½, charge of ⅔, baryon number of ⅓, mass of 360 MeV/c2, and so on (Lange [2011], p. 54). For 
these reasons, it seems wise to interpret HPC kinds as a subgroup of kinds.  
 Adopting this sort of compartmentalized stance about HPC kinds has its strategic advantages in 
any case. For one, it allows essentialists and defenders of other accounts to reign more or less 
                                                
5 The HPC account actually exhibits a couple of dimensions of flexibility. Wilson et al. note its “natural flexibility” 
repeatedly ([2007], pp. 190, 197, 207), referring both to the ability of a cluster to include extrinsic as well as intrinsic 
properties and to allow some of them to go missing. In the next section, I shall offer a few reasons for thinking that we 
can and should increase this flexibility further. 
6 Some have suggested to me that Boyd saw what he was doing as more expansive than this—that he was offering a 
maximally general account of natural kinds. Whether or not this is Boyd’s view, this stance is unreasonable for reasons I 
will summarize shortly. 
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unchallenged in their separate fiefdoms. If a particular example of a purported natural kind fits 
poorly in the HPC mold, the HPCer needn’t press the matter. She can shrug and admit that the 
purported kind may not be an HPC kind while maintaining that some kinds are. While there is 
nothing inappropriate about this maneuver, I think that we can do better. I am not alone. Alexander 
Bird also suggested that the HPC account 
can be extended to all natural kinds. The laws will explain why there are certain 
clusters; they will also explain the natures of those clusters—the loose and vague 
clusters in biology, the partially precise clusters of chemistry and the perfectly precise 
clusters of particle physics. Boyd introduces his idea in order to provide an alternative 
to the essentialist view of natural kinds. However, if I am right, the homeostatic 
property cluster approach can be expanded to include the essentialist view in respect 
of the kinds to which it applies. ([2007], pp. 210–211) 
Unlike Bird, however, I believe that we will need to modify the foundations of the HPC account in 
order to generalize it to all natural kinds. My proposed modification drops the requirement of 
homeostatic causal mechanisms in favor of a flexible notion of stability for property clusters.  
 If this modification was motivated only by the desire only to expand the HPC account’s scope, it 
would be of limited interest. However, I will argue that it also addresses concerns facing even the 
narrow interpretation of the HPC account. To contextualize my proposal, it’s worth stepping back 
for a moment to consider what makes HPC kinds a particular variety of natural kind. Why are they 
not a different phenomenon altogether? The most straightforward answer—and an area of consensus 
between HPCers and the neo-essentialists—involves the epistemic role that natural kinds are 
supposed to play. To this we now turn. 
 
3 The Role of Natural Kinds in our Epistemic Practices 
A centerpiece of Boyd’s account of natural kinds is his Accommodation Thesis: “the theory of 
natural kinds is about how schemes of classification contribute to the formulation and identification 
of projectible hypotheses” (Boyd [1999], p. 147). This stance seems at least implicit in recent history 
of thinking about natural kinds (Hacking [1991]), extending into the neo-essentialist accounts of the 
1970s and forward. We see in Putnam, for instance, an explicit tying together of the metaphysics 
and epistemic role of natural kinds: they are “classes of things that we regard as of explanatory 
importance: classes whose normal distinguishing characteristics are ‘held together’ or even explained 
by deep-lying mechanisms” ([1975], p. 139). This is very much of a piece with Boyd’s view: this 
“holding together” of properties associated with kinds what affords their explanatory and inferential 
importance.  
                                                                                                                                                       
7 Even their title, “When Traditional Essentialism Fails”, suggests that HPC is a sort of liberal fallback account of natural 
kinds—reserved for when things get too rowdy for the tidy, conservative essentialist account to manage. 
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  Two important questions arise at this juncture. One question concerns the interpretation of the 
phenomena gestured at using such metaphors as “clustering”, “holding together”, 
“sociability/intimacy” and how exactly such phenomena contribute to our epistemic projects. A 
second question asks after the metaphysical explanation for these phenomena. Though the questions 
blur together to some extent, we might think of the first question as directed at articulating a 
particular explanandum (the existence of a clustering phenomenon—or phenomena—and its 
connection to some of our epistemic practices) and the second as its explanans: what accounts for the 
clustering/sociability of properties in virtue of which we enjoy a measure of inductive success.  
 Clearly, the second question has received the lion’s share of philosophers’ attention. This is in 
one sense unsurprising. After all, the above metaphors are evocative (if imprecise) and it might be 
regarded as reasonably apparent that the “holding together” (somehow understood) of a bunch of 
characteristics would contribute to our epistemic lives. More exciting is the prospect of connecting 
these epistemic projects with some underlying metaphysics and semantic theory. Forging such a link 
would not only fit into the broader naturalistic project in epistemology8 but would also shore up 
scientific realism—so some suppose, anyway.  
 Both the HPC and the essentialist accounts can be interpreted as emphasizing the second 
question, focusing on the something—be it an essence, a homeostatic mechanism, or some other 
feature of “the causal structure of the world”—they believe must underlie or explain the sociability of 
a set of properties. As Boyd put it in an early paper: “Kinds useful for induction or explanation must 
always ‘cut the world at its joints’ in this sense: successful induction and explanation always require 
that we accommodate our categories to the causal structure of the world” (Boyd [1991], p. 139). 
 The emphasis on the second question over the first is in another way surprising, however. For in 
judging whether some account of natural kinds can satisfy the accommodation demands of a given 
discipline, don’t we need a precise understanding of the phenomena that the account is supposed to 
save?9 Perhaps those pursuing the second question presume that offering an account of the 
metaphysics of kinds would automatically shed light on their epistemic roles. 
 The asymmetric emphasis on the metaphysics of “clustering” also reflects a popular strand of 
thought in general discussions of the problem of induction—especially in those of the 
“explanationist” tradition pioneered by Harman ([1965]).10 Suppose that every F we’ve ever 
observed has been G. Given an amenable background, we may be inclined to infer that every F is a 
                                                
8 Kornblith begins his ([1993]) book, Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground—an extension and discussion of Boyd’s 
HPC account—with an epigraph from Quine’s paper “Natural Kinds”: “For me then the problem of induction is a 
problem about the world: a problem of how we, as we now are (by our present scientific lights), in a world we never 
made, should stand better than random or coin-tossing chances of coming out right when we predict by inductions 
which are based on our innate, scientifically unjustified similarity standard” ([1969], p. 127). Accordingly, Part I of 
Kornblith’s book is entitled “What Is the World That We May Know It?”. 
9 Lange ([2000], p. 4) pressed a similar question in response to popular reductive approaches to natural laws; see also 
(Lange [2005c]). 
10 See (White [2005]) for a clear and detailed discussion of the strategy of using explanation to guide and justify. 
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G. But what justifies this inference? The explanationist purports to offer a way of avoiding (or 
delaying) the inductive skeptic. If the best explanation of our observations of only G Fs is that all Fs 
are G, then we are (defeasibly) entitled to infer that this explanation is correct. 
 Explanationists recognize that philosophical care is required here. For one, it must be clear that 
we are explaining a fact about our observations (that we haven’t ever seen a non-G F), not a fact 
concerning the G Fs we’ve seen. That this particular frog is green is not explained by the fact that all 
frogs are green; ditto for all the observed frogs (Peacocke [2004], p. 139).11 For two, it seems to 
many in this tradition that some kind of “non-accidentality” condition must be met. Peacocke offers 
the following illustration: 
Suppose one hundred spinnings of a roulette wheel are spinnings in which the ball 
lands on red, and suppose we observed the first fifty spinnings. The fact that all of 
the hundred spinnings ended with the ball landing on red is sufficient to explain why 
all the fifty observations of spinnings are ones in which the ball landed on red. But an 
inductive inference to the fifty-first spinning that it will end with the ball landing on 
red is unsound. The generalization does give the explanation of our evidence, but we 
are not entitled to the inductive inference if we know the wheel to be unbiased. 
(ibid.) 
What is required, argues Peacocke, is a commitment to the existence of “some condition C that 
explains why all the Fs are G” (p. 141).  
 Concerning natural kinds, Ruth Millikan writes along similar lines that “Clearly a concept 
having [rich inductive potential] does not emerge by ontological accident. If a term is to have 
genuine [inductive potential], it had better attach not just to an accidental pattern of correlated 
properties, but to properties correlated for a good reason” ([2000], p. 17). Kornblith puts the point 
this way: 
Inductive inferences can only work, short of divine intervention, if there is something 
in nature binding together the properties which we use to identify kinds. Our 
inductive inferences in science have worked remarkably well, and, moreover, we have 
succeeded in identifying the ways in which the observable properties which draw 
kinds to our attention are bound together in nature. In light of these successes, we 
can hardly go on to doubt the existence of the very kinds which serve to explain how 
such successes were even possible. ([1993], p. 42) 
While I am sympathetic to Kornblith’s line on the source of our confidence that there are such 
kinds, I disagree with the claim that the epistemic value of natural kinds is contingent on the 
                                                
11 As White ([2005]) points out, some philosophers deny this. Harman ([1973]), for instance, urges a distinction 
between explanation and causation: while the greenness of a particular frog is not caused by the fact that all frogs are 
green, the generalization does indeed explain it. 
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existence of some concrete ground—some essence, mechanism, or feature of the causal structure of 
the world—that Kornblith believes “binds together the properties which we use to identify kinds”. 
Call this The Grounding Claim; its broad acceptance seems a likely explanation for the emphasis on 
the metaphysics of natural kinds to the comparative neglect of the precise epistemic role they play.  
 Before building a case against the Grounding Claim and laying out my alternative approach to 
kinds, it’s worth distinguishing between two “epistemic roles” natural kinds might be taken to play 
in our inductive practices (leave aside our explanatory practices for the moment). Very 
optimistically, we might see the identification of natural kinds as providing us with rational 
justification of inductive inference. Evaluating the tenability of such an “ontological solution to an 
epistemological problem [the problem of induction]” (Sankey [1997], p. 239) is beyond the scope of 
this essay.12 But I don’t think we have to see natural kinds as issuing inductive warrant in order to see 
them as playing a necessary role in certain sorts of inductive inferences. Modest realists, for instance, 
can interpret the “projectibility” of certain categories as amounting to a metaphysical fact about 
those categories and a epistemological matter concerning our recognition of this fact (presumably in 
the context of much background knowledge).13 It is this latter role I would like to focus on in this 
paper. What features must kinds have in order to be “apt” for inductive inference in this latter sense? 
This is the question I will aim to answer in §5 in offering a new, broadly unifying account of natural 
kinds—or, as I prefer to put it, “natural kindness”. But first, let us begin to consider the plausibility 
of the Grounding Claim as put to work by the HPC approach to kinds. 
 
4 Concern over Causal Mechanism 
Whereas Essentialists typically see microstructural essences as binding together the properties 
associated with a natural kind, HPC advocates see causal homeostatic mechanisms as playing that 
role. In each case, though, this metaphysical grounding is supposed to be responsible for kinds’ 
epistemic potential. The shift from essences to mechanisms purportedly allows for the greater 
flexibility familiar in HPC kinds while still accommodating our inductive practices (in accordance 
with the Grounding Claim).  
 However, I will argue that there is cause for skepticism on this latter count: the existence of the 
causal mechanisms proffered by HPCers are (alone) neither clearly necessary nor sufficient for the 
stable clustering thought to underpin cluster kinds’ projectibility. I address the sufficiency concern 
first (in §4.1), describing a circularity and regress problem for the HPC account. Then (in §4.2), I 
describe cases that suggest that that the relevant kind of stability can be had without the 
mechanisms. This will serve as my main argument against the Grounding Claim and will lead us 
                                                
12 I will say that I am not this optimistic; see (Beebee [2011]) for a nice discussion of how neo-essentialists such as Ellis 
([2001]) fail in their attempts to solve the problem of induction. 
13 ‘Projectibility’ has of course been used ambiguously to refer just to the metaphysical fact (in which case a category 
might be projectible without our knowing it) and to the “composite” fact that adds our (justifiable) willingness to 
actually formulate inductive projections using the category. 
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into a positive proposal for what I believe is a more satisfying and general approach to natural kinds 
(§§5–6). 
 
4.1 Sufficiency Worries 
Ideally, in order to answer the question of whether causal homeostatic mechanisms can serve as the 
ontological ground for the epistemic fertility of (a subclass of) natural kinds, we would draw on a 
precise account of how to characterize the phenomenon (or, possibly, phenomena) metaphorically 
described as “clustering”, “holding together”, “sociability”, and so on. Unfortunately, little has been 
said on this subject. I will offer my own take in §5.2; but for the purposes of this section, I simply 
take as my target the intuitive idea (gestured at via the metaphors) that homeostatic mechanisms are 
always sufficient to underpin a sort of counterfactually stable (if imperfect) clustering of some 
properties in virtue of which HPC kinds are projectible. 
 A parallel difficulty is that the concepts of a “causal homeostatic mechanism” or “the causal 
structure of the world” have been little more clarified. But even with a specific and uncontroversial 
account of causal mechanism in hand, some worry whether such mechanisms will be able to play the 
grounding and individuative roles HPCers envision. Carl Craver ([2009]) has argued, for example, 
that contemporary accounts of causal mechanism (e.g., Bechtel [2006]; Bechtel & Abrahamsen 
[2005]; C. Craver [2007]; Machamer, et al. [2000]) lack the resources for generating objective 
divisions between kinds. For it is not always clear whether two phenomena are expressions of the 
same kind of mechanism or where one mechanism begins and another ends. This is particularly 
problematic for HPCers (such as Griffiths [1997], pp. 171–174) who emphasize the importance of 
dividing HPC kinds along lines of causal mechanism. Craver puts the worry in terms of “lumping” 
and “splitting” purported kinds on the basis of investigations into the mechanisms which maintain 
those kinds’ property stability: “one can be led to lump or split the same putative kind in different 
ways depending on which mechanism one consults in accommodating the taxonomy to the 
mechanistic structure of the world” (2009, 583).  
 So if Craver is correct that “human perspectives and conventions enter into judgments about 
how mechanisms should be typed and individuated” (591), then it would appear that what natural 
kinds on the HPC view will depend on those perspectives and conventions, leading to a denial of the 
Realist Presumption and what many will regard as an unacceptably conventionalist pluralism about 
what kinds there are. As will become clear shortly, I am less concerned about the sort of 
conventionalism Craver believes the HPCer is saddled with. Though it will have different causes on 
my account, I believe that at least for many categories, we are forced into a deep pluralism and 
domain-relativity about natural kinds.14  
                                                
14 Craver’s point, however, should be taken seriously by those unwilling to embrace this level of conventionalism or 
pluralism: Boyd’s Accommodation Thesis seems to place a normative demand on our practices of classification that is 
incompatible with the degree of conventionalism arguably involved in individuating mechanisms. To meet this 
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 Conventionalism aside, however, Craver raises a regress worry about mechanism individuation 
that goes to the heart their theoretical role in the HPC account. In speaking of dividing mechanisms, 
HPCers presumably have in mind dividing them into kinds. Perhaps in some cases—e.g., with 
species—the self-same mechanism might be thought to maintain the coherence of a property cluster. 
In many others, however—e.g., cell types (Slater [2013])—the relevant mechanisms would 
presumably be distinct tokens of the same type. Hepatocytes (cells that make up most of your liver), 
for example, would be the kind of cell they are in virtue of possessing a distinctive cluster of 
properties whose stability is maintained by a certain kind of hepatocyte-making/maintaining 
mechanism. But what account should we offer for understanding these mechanism kinds? Here’s how 
Craver puts the concerns: 
Property clusters are united in a kind because their clustering is explained by a single 
kind of mechanism. When are mechanisms mechanisms of the same kind? If one 
responds that mechanisms are mechanisms of the same kind when they are explained 
by a single kind of mechanism, the regress is transparent. If the answer is that 
mechanisms of the same kind are composed of the same kinds of entities, activities, 
and organizational features, then we need some way to unite entities and activities 
into natural kinds. Either way, we only stave off our ignorance of natural kinds a 
little longer. ([2009], p. 586) 
One might attempt to evade the problem by disallowing mechanisms of the same type from doing 
the individuating work—insisting instead that HPC kinds be defined by individual instances of 
mechanisms (mechanism tokens).15 Unfortunately, this insistence would lead to a rather revisionary 
position about many scientific categories. Insofar as distinct physiological mechanisms are 
responsible for the similarities between hepatocytes in my liver and those in the liver of my wife, 
these would have to count as distinct kinds of cells.  
 Another strategy would be to interpret mechanism types as a different sort of kind—either along 
traditional essentialist or other (possibly sui generis) lines. The first option does not appear 
particularly promising. It’s doubtful that an essentialist account would accommodate a reasonable 
division of mechanisms into types—not, at least, in the biological world, where bio-mechanism types 
appear to exhibit as much internal heterogeneity we see in the biological world generally. The second 
                                                                                                                                                       
objection, HPCer must either say something substantive in order to reclaim the objectivity of the “mechanistic structure 
of the world” or weaken the accommodation thesis. 
15 P.D. Magnus suggested this move to me as a way of handling the application of the HPC view to species. I do not take 
him as an advocate of the view in general, however. 
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option is impossible to evaluate without some specific candidate account.16 All things being equal, 
the HPC account would seem the obvious choice. But this leads us into Craver’s vicious regress. 
 However, one might object at this point that even if there was some regress here, who’s to say 
that it won’t halt somewhere?17 Might we not entertain the following scenario (see Figure 1)? 
 
Figure 1: Mechanism Regress 
  
                                                
16 I should note that the problem is exacerbated by attempting to generalize the HPC account. Perhaps this is one reason 
why HPCers might wish to see their account as describing only a subtype of natural kinds—a subtype that is 
conceptually parasitic on other natural kind accounts. 
17 Thanks to Marc Lange for suggesting this response and pressing me to expand this discussion. 
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Suppose that the mechanism type (A) that maintains the stable clustering of the properties 
characterizing kind Φ is best understood as another HPC kind (Ψ). Kind Ψ must in turn be analyzed 
in the HPC mould as being characterized as a mechanistically-stabilized cluster of properties. The 
regress looms: another mechanism type (B) requires analysis. Perhaps it too is best characterized as an 
HPC kind, and so on. But if it can instead be characterized as an essentialist kind, the HPCer is out 
of the woods.  
 That this sort of analysis may be possible in some cases, I won't dispute (though I cannot think 
of a clear example). That it is always possible for any given HPC kind seems highly questionable. 
What, aside from allegiance to some sort of general reductionist stance about biology, would justify 
such a claim? When we reflect on the fact that the heterogeneity of high-level biological categories is 
generally recapitulated at lower levels of mechanistic organization, the prospect of halting our regress 
at something other than a primitive notion of mechanism type is dubious.18 
 The second regress has a more practical character. On the traditional account of natural kinds, 
essences play the role of a sort of “metaphysical cement” that enables certain characteristic epistemic 
efforts. Perhaps there are epistemic conditions under which noting that something has properties P, 
Q, and R—all standard effects of having property E, the essence of a particular kind Φ—gives us 
prima facie warrant for inferring that this thing is of kind Φ and thus possesses the other properties 
S, T to which E gives rise. E offers us this warrant insofar as these various causal entailments are 
themselves known (or justifiably believed) and are non-accidental in some appropriately robust sense.  
 Even when E’s identity is unknown, treating some category as a kind (in this traditional sense) 
may be tantamount to accepting the existence of something like Peacocke’s “condition C”: that there 
must be something that explains the stability of properties P, Q, R, S, T, &c. Possessing good reason 
for making this commitment—being justified that category ϕ should be treated as a natural kind for 
certain epistemic purposes—is arguably often part of the background knowledge we rely on when 
inferring things about members of kinds (Godfrey-Smith [2011]).  
 On the HPC account, homeostatic mechanisms take over the essence E’s role. However, even 
paradigmatically homeostatic mechanisms—for example, those involved in the maintenance of an 
organism’s physiological states within certain tolerances—need not themselves be stable. There are 
conditions under which those mechanisms fail or simply shut down. When those conditions are 
well-understood (as they often are in physiological cases), we make allowances accordingly—
relativizing the kind, perhaps, to “normal conditions” or implicitly seeing the given mechanism as 
necessarily embedded in a larger-scale mechanism.19 The homeostatic mechanisms that maintain the 
                                                
18 I do not deny, of course, that bio-mechanisms are constituted by parts which are decomposable into pieces—molecules, 
atoms, and so forth—that do not demand a HPC treatment. The present regress concern pertains to analysis, however. 
And it is scarcely obvious that the analysis of a particular HPC kind should always terminate in kinds characterizable in 
non-HPC terms. 
19 Note that if one construes the causal mechanisms as playing an individuative role, we may face tricky questions in the 
spirit of Craver’s original challenge about whether to lump or split different mechanistic ensembles. 
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stable co-instantiation of a hepatocyte’s properties depend on the successful operation of a whole 
host of enabling mechanisms that keep it switched on. The point is that the mere existence of a 
homeostatic causal mechanism responsible for clustering some properties does not by itself ensure 
that that clustering will be sufficiently robust to ground our epistemic practices.20  
 To see this, consider an analogy. My guest room has a separate thermostat, a homeostatic 
mechanism par excellence. It is designed to maintain a consistent, comfortable temperature in the 
room by adjusting the heating and cooling in predictable ways given different circumstances. But it 
is not homeostatic for all circumstances. It needs to be properly hooked up, powered on, and so on. 
This arrangement has obvious advantages. When I don’t have guests, I switch the heat off in the 
room and allow its temperature to vary according to the weather. The fact that there are conditions 
under which the mechanism doesn’t operate hardly entails that the thermostat isn’t a homeostatic 
mechanism when it is powered on. But clearly, the fact that it is a homeostatic mechanism (when 
powered on) won’t explain the stability of the room’s temperature unless we know that it is likely to 
stay powered on. If my wiring is temperamental, my guests are likely to complain about the 
inconstant temperatures during their stay. Even if the thermostat itself has a tendency to occasionally 
short out, we still might consider it a homeostatic mechanism. Suppose that in fact it doesn’t short 
out during my guests’ stay. Does the fact that the heating and cooling of the room is regulated by a 
homeostatic mechanism constitute a full explanation of the stability of the temperature in the room 
during that period? I don’t think so. What is needed, in addition, is some explanation of the absence 
of whatever suffices to short out the thermostat (perhaps only bad luck). 
 Many homeostatic mechanisms have this character, operating only for a time or in some but not 
other conditions. They can be homeostatic in some respects but flighty or unreliable in others. 
Simply stipulating that there be some mechanistic explanation for the clustering of some properties 
does not clearly ensure that such clustering will be stable. Nor does it help to pile on further 
mechanisms—for this will just initiate a regress. Suppose that it’s very important that my guest room 
remain a comfortable temperature for a time. Being lazy but technologically ingenious, I design a 
robot to watch the thermostat and switch it back on whenever it craps out. But now we must ask 
after the stability of the robot-watcher’s mechanism. And what watches the watcher? Another robot, 
perhaps? The threatened regress can of course be stopped at any stage by offering a mechanism that 
guarantees the sort of stability that accommodation to our epistemic practices demands (whatever 
this turns out to be). But now we are elsewhere from a mere homeostatic causal mechanism. Rather 
than attempting to offer an account of the sort of homeostatic mechanisms we need, however, I will 
propose in §4 that we would do better to circumvent mechanisms altogether and simply focus on 
articulating a conception of the sort of stability a property cluster needs to possess in order to serve 
                                                
20 Again, I must ask for your patience in waiting until §5 for a fuller story about what such robustness comes to. I will 
briefly readdress the issues broached here at that point. 
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the epistemic functions we are used to natural kinds serving. Before defending this proposal, we 
consider one more class of concerns with the HPC approach. 
 
4.2 Necessity Worries 
My aim in the previous subsection was to cast some doubt on the sufficiency of causal homeostatic 
mechanisms to ground our epistemic practices. Now I want to press on their necessity. As I 
mentioned above, many scientifically important categories—such as elementary particles or chemical 
species—are associated with clusters of properties whose stability is not plausibly maintained by 
causal homeostatic mechanisms. HPCers can handle such cases easily by simply restricting the scope 
of the HPC account to cover only the categories where essentialism fails. But there remain some 
cases apparently within HPC’s purview for which it is difficult to make out the activity of causal 
mechanisms. 
 Consider species. Long regarded as paradigm cases of natural kinds, the neo-essentialists assumed 
that each species taxon could be defined by some shared real essence which bound together the 
nominal essences associated with the taxa. As before, the HPC account offers a parallel explanation 
for the “clumpyness” of such properties. Here is Boyd: 
It is, I take it, uncontroversial that biological species . . . exhibit something like the 
sort of property homeostasis that defines homeostatic property cluster natural kinds. 
A variety of homeostatic mechanisms—gene exchange between certain populations 
and reproductive isolations from others, effects of common selective factors, 
coadapted gene complexes and other limitations on heritable variation, 
developmental constraints, the effects of the organism-caused features of evolutionary 
niches, and so on—act to establish the patterns of evolutionary stasis that we 
recognize as manifestations of biological species. ([1999], pp. 164–165) 
While it is true that evolutionary theory provides us with many candidate explanations for the degree 
of similarity we see between the organisms of a species, it is not obvious that these explanations (or 
ensembles of them) can be interpreted in mechanistic terms.21 Talk of evolutionary “pressures”, 
“forces”, and “mechanisms” is natural, but the appropriateness of these interpretations are 
controversial. Take, for example, the reference to “common selective factors” which (I presume) are 
suppose to constitute a stabilizing mechanism (in virtue of its selecting out organisms whose traits 
are not within a certain adaptive range). In recent years, a controversy has raged about whether to 
interpret natural selection as a cause of evolutionary change (the “dynamical interpretation”) or 
whether it should instead be interpreted as a non-causal, statistical properties of populations (the 
                                                
21 And again, HPCers wishing to see mechanisms as individuating species kinds will face some tricky questions about 
how to divide the overlapping influences of such mechanisms. 
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“statistical interpretation”).22 Denying a causal interpretation of natural selection requires (on any 
reasonable account of mechanism) denying that natural selection should be construed as a 
“mechanism”. The matter does not turn solely on the fortunes of Statisticalism, however. Even some 
of Statisticalism’s critics have argued that “neither of the two main conceptions of mechanism 
adequately captures natural selection as a mechanism” (see also Barros [2008]; Havstad [2011]; 
Skipper & Millstein [2005], p. 328).  
 The situation is more complicated at different taxonomic ranks. Consider sibling species: 
morphologically (nearly) indistinguishable species. Mayr reports in his classic discussion of the fruit 
flies Drosophila persimilis and Drosophila pseudoobscura that though initially thought to be physically 
identical, a number of differences were eventually discovered ([1963], p. 35). His presumption, of 
course (as a trenchant defender of the biological species concept,23 is that the discovery of the 
existence of homeostatic mechanisms preserving the reproductive isolation of the two Drosophila 
species (and thus the stability of each species’ properties), compels their basal separation as distinct 
species. It does not, however, compel their separation as natural kinds: for we might very plausibly 
regard the whole Drosophila genus as a natural kind encompassing both species kinds (Boyd [1999], 
p. 176).  
 Suppose we do regard Drosophila as a natural kind: what is the homeostatic mechanism “holding 
together” the cluster of properties we initially identify as characteristic of that genus? Not a 
propensity to interbreed—for we have two reproductively-isolated species! Ereshefsky and Matthen 
suggest that the two separate “interbreeding structures share a common historical origin and are 
subject to very similar environmental pressures: this is why members of the two species are similar to 
each other” ([2005], p. 6). Wilson et al. similarly propose that “biological individuals often are as 
they are and behave as they do because of the relations in which they stand” ([2007], p. 198). But in 
the case of common historical origins, homeostasis seems like the wrong metaphor. What we have is 
not the resistance to disrupting a cluster of properties by the workings of certain causal connections 
but the stability of such clusters due to their relative causal isolation—the absence of potentially-
perturbing causal pathways from the here and now to the there and then. Such cases seem better 
characterized by what Griffiths calls “phylogenetic inertia” ([1999], p. 220)—they are, in Francis 
Crick’s memorable phrase, “frozen accidents” ([1968]).24 
                                                
22 For defense of Statisticalism, see (Matthen & Ariew [2002]), (Walsh, Lewens, & Ariew [2002]), and (Walsh [2007]); 
for critical discussion see (Millstein [2006]) and (Brandon & Ramsey [2007]). 
23 according to which species are “interbreeding natural populations that are reproductively isolated from other such 
groups” (Mayr [1963], p. 17). 
24 Though in some cases this “inertia” resembles that of Aristotelian physics—with traits atrophying “when no selective 
forces work to maintain them” (Griffiths [1999], p. 220) —, a more Newtonian model seems widely appropriate. Even 
the Aristotelian model of phylogenetic inertia is acceptable if the rate of “atrophy” (due to the effects of genetic drift, and 
so on) is long enough to suit the purposes of the particular sciences in which a kind is embedded. 
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 One might object at this point that causal homeostatic mechanisms underpin phylogenetic 
inertia insofar as reproduction and development are (relatively) high-fidelity copying mechanisms. 
This looks ad hoc. For it is uncontroversial that they are low-fidelity enough to allow for the 
variation that fuels evolutionary change via natural selection. We cannot simply regard reproduction 
and development as maintaining the coherence of a cluster of properties just when selection and drift 
do not disrupt the homogenizing activity of reproduction and development. Otherwise, we trivialize 
their role: they become the relevant mechanisms unless they’re not.25 
 One might also argue that my reluctance to treat “common selective regimes” as homeostatic 
mechanisms merely betrays an overly particular (or literal) conception of homeostatic mechanisms. I 
might be persuaded to plead guilty to this charge (I try to banish images of clockwork!) if HPCers 
admit in return that they need to say more about what constitutes a homeostatic mechanism. Be this 
as it may, other examples seem to me non-negotiable. Just reflect on the fact that many of the sorts 
of processes Boyd and other HPCers focus on can actually be engaged in pulling the members of a 
kind apart. Only stabilizing selection is a decent candidate for mechanistic treatment. 
 Consider, for example, a species taxon which accommodates our epistemic practices in ways we’d 
expect to see from a natural kind. Clearly, we cannot count on this category always playing these 
roles—natural selection might disrupt the stability of the associated property cluster. We need to 
remember that in some cases the disrupting influences of selection are ever-present. Individuals on 
the extreme ends of a trait parameter may have an evolutionary edge over their more moderate kin; 
this will generally give rise to disruptive selection and possibly speciation (see Figure 2). Such 
selective regimes are quite implausible as “homeostatic mechanisms”. Nor need they be 
“heterostatic”, maintaining differences within a population. But discovering that disruptive selection 
is operating on a particular taxon need not besmirch that taxon’s epistemic utility. Accordingly, it 
does not show us that we were wrong to treat that category as a natural kind. For in certain scientific 
contexts (such as conservation ecology, medicine, and functional biology) where stability across 
evolutionary timescales is of little concern, even species in disruptive (“heterodynamic”) selection 
                                                
25 Thanks to P.D. Magnus for pushing me on this issue. Once one sees this pattern, similar cases are relatively easy to 
spot. I have elsewhere suggested that different enantiomers of biochemical species might be considered to be distinct 
natural kinds (Slater [2005]). But enantiomers seem like paradigm cases of kinds whose characteristic properties are 
maintained neither by a common microstructural essence nor causal mechanism. They are merely “stuck” in three-
dimensional space in ways that are causally isolated and given certain types of chiral environments lead to the 
manifestation of different characteristic dispositions. One might object to my treatment of this case in like fashion by 
contending that molecular structure of enantiomers, while evidently unable to serve a role as essences, do maintain the 
conjunction of intrinsic and extrinsic properties constitutive of being a particular enantiomer by resisting the sort of 
contortions that would be required to turn one enantiomer into the other. I cannot say more about this case in this 
context except to point out that even if the intrinsic structure of a chiral molecule causally explains the maintenance of its 
associated cluster of properties, it does not explain why those properties are stably maintained. As with the “high(ish)-
fidelity copying mechanisms” suggestion, the explanandum is merely the stability of whatever properties a certain 
category possesses, not the fact that the particular properties in the cluster are stable. I’m not certain how much this 
should bother us. 
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regimes may possess a cluster of properties which are stable enough to afford inference and 
explanation in those contexts. 
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Figure 2: In this schematic depiction of a disruptive selection regime, we have a particular trait parameter—say, beak 
length in a species of bird—that has a bimodal fitness distribution (in a given environment, it’s good to have a small beak 
and a large beak). All things being equal, we can expect that in this will result in a trend in the population toward a 
prevalence of small- and large-beaked organisms. 
 
 It might be thought that as soon as we grant the workings of these heterodynamic forces working 
to pull apart clustered properties, we see right away that there must be opposing homeostatic 
mechanisms (intrinsic or extrinsic) at work as well maintaining the stability of the clusters. The 
mechanisms of reproduction and development will again seem tempting candidates. But the fact of 
short-timescale stability in the face of disruptive selection needn’t imply the imperfect workings of 
homeostatic mechanisms ultimately fighting a loosing battle.  
 
*  *  * 
 
Thus far, I have interpreted the HPC account as according a literal, crucial role to causal 
homeostatic mechanisms. I argued that a number of practical and theoretical problems crop up as we 
examine this role in further detail. However, it might be objected that I am over-interpreting what is 
meant to be a metaphor. If that’s so, I may be read as challenging the aptness of the metaphor. 
Anyway, I believe that an account of natural kinds ought to rest on firmer theoretical foundation 
than a metaphorical similarity to other known entities and processes—especially when talk of such 
entities already presumes some conception of “kindness”.  
 It may be possible to articulate a conception of causal homeostatic mechanisms that would 
circumvent the concerns I have articulated here—I do not claim that any of the considerations I 
have sketched above are decisive. But they give me sufficient pause to want to offer a different 
account. It seems to me prudent to focus on the intended effect of the existence of essences and the 
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operation of causal homeostatic mechanisms in virtue of which natural kind categories contribute to 
our epistemic practices: that the clustering is, in a sense to be discussed, stable.  
 
5 Stable Property Cluster Kinds 
5.1 The Basic Idea 
Let us return to the example of the roulette wheel. Peacocke’s demand that some condition ensure 
the repeated red-spinnings might be seen as a way of ensuring the stability or robustness of this 
occurrence. The modal fragility of such an occurrence—the sense in which had various things gone 
very slightly differently with the spinning, we wouldn’t have seen fifty reds—seems to imply a 
temporal fragility that cancels any inductive warrant we might possess. This seems quite plausible. If 
some truth could easily have been false, then who’s to say that it won’t go false any time from now? 
On reflection, however, we can see that the implication does not hold in general. There are lots of 
facts that are modally fragile in the sense that they very easily might not have occurred—for example, 
that Cletus the clumsy archer won the archery tournament yesterday—but which are not in any 
danger of ceasing to be true in the future.  
 Even if one rejects this modal-to-temporal implication, one might still insist that our inductive 
and explanatory practices need to be grounded by more than just dumb luck; it must be more than 
an accident that we are right. This general idea seems to be behind many of the defenses of the 
Grounding Claim mentioned in §3. But when it comes to the projectibility of a kind, the 
ontological ground—an essence, a causal homeostatic mechanism—is only a means to an 
epistemically-significant end (and if the previous section’s arguments are on the right track, in the 
case of cluster kinds, the proffered homeostatic mechanisms are neither always necessary nor 
sufficient means). Peter Lipton expressed a similar sentiment in commenting on Kornblith’s 
application of the HPC account to the problem of inductive knowledge; he wrote: “Essences are 
supposed to hold together observable properties in stable clusters, but it is not made clear why this 
should make for a more inductively knowable world than one where that stability is a brute fact” 
([1996], p. 493).26 
 Accordingly, I suggest that an account of natural kinds would do better to focus on the special 
sort of stability a cluster of properties might possess in virtue of which it is apt for induction and 
explanation rather than focusing on the something causing that stability. Hence my proposed name: 
the Stable Property Cluster account of natural kinds. As with the HPC account, SPC kinds are 
associated with potentially-loose clusters of properties. Unlike the HPC account, it requires only that 
these properties be sufficiently stably coinstantiated to accommodate the inferential and explanatory 
                                                
26 In like fashion, Sören Häggqvist argues that “the demand for underlying mechanisms, even short of demanding 
internal micro-mechanisms, is still excessive. It is not at all clear why the lack of such mechanisms should impair the 
soundness of a kind” ([2005], p. 80). 
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uses to which particular sciences put such categories.27 The shift of focus from mechanisms to 
stability scores three significant goals. First, the SPC account evades the problems with mechanisms’ 
role in the HPC account discussed above. Even categories associated with clusters of properties 
whose sociability are gradually being disrupted by heterodynamic selection regimes can underpin our 
epistemic practices in virtue of their having sufficient stability for the purposes of the relevant 
sciences. Ditto for categories whose cluster’s stability is not maintained by any mechanism in 
particular. Second, it achieves an attractive degree of neutrality. Stability, as I shall understand it, is a 
high-level concept that is independent of its particular realizers and their analysis. Third, it 
represents a more general account of natural kinds able to encompass the above-mentioned kinds as 
well as strict essentialist kinds, kinds with historical essences (Griffiths [1999]; Okasha [2002]), and 
HPC kinds whose clusters’ stability are largely secured by homeostatic causal mechanisms (in the 
right context). The stability that lends itself to a kind’s inductive and explanatory utility is, as 
philosophers are apt to say, multiply realized. 
 
5.2. Two Conceptions of Stability 
What might it mean to call a cluster of properties “stable”? One first stab might focus on the 
instantiation of the clustered properties by a particular individual—an instance of the kind associated 
with that cluster. Say that a property cluster kind ϕ is instance-stable when (to a first approximation) 
satisfiers of ϕ (individuals of the kind ϕ) do not easily relinquish the relevant cluster of properties. 
Once instantiated, the instances of the properties in ϕ resist their non-instantiation—perhaps 
collectively by constituting a homeostatic mechanism.  
 Instance stability is both too strong and too weak to characterize natural kinds. It is too strong 
inasmuch as it implies that kind membership is “sticky”. Once a particular thing satisfies the cluster 
of properties associated with a kind ϕ, it resists becoming not-ϕ. But while this may be characteristic 
of some kinds (cases where kind-essence and individual-essence are somehow bound together), other 
objects apparently change their kind quite readily. Instance stability is too weak in that it does not 
sufficiently account for kinds’ epistemic role. To see this, let us consider a schematic example. 
 Suppose that ϕ is a kind associated with a cluster of properties P, Q, R, S, T. We can use brackets 
to denote that these properties are clustered without presuming the involvement of other abstracta 
(to wit, sets): [P, Q, R, S, T]; for convenience, let us also use the name of the kind enclosed in 
brackets as a notational equivalent: [ϕ]. We can think of ‘[ϕ]’ as functioning linguistically as a 
predicate: e.g., that some particular j is a member of cluster kind ϕ could be symbolized as ‘[ϕ]j’ or 
‘[P, Q, R, S, T]j ’ (depending on how specific we wished to be)—so long as we do not think of this 
as reducing to either ‘Pj ∧ Qj ∧ Rj ∧ Sj ∧ Tj’ or ‘Pj ∨ Qj ∨ Rj ∨ Sj ∨ Tj’. For on the cluster kind 
view, for j to be a member of ϕ is not for it to have all of (or at least one of) P, Q, R, S, T. Rather, it 
                                                
27 As I will discuss in §6, these two qualifications carry with them some interesting (and I think welcome) consequences. 
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is for j to have a cluster of those properties. For now, I leave this notion at an intuitive level—
something along the lines of “a goodly many of the properties in question”. We can represent ϕ’s 
instance-stability as the claim that for all x, 
[P, Q, R, S, T]x →■[P, Q, R, S, T]x 
using ‘■’ for now as a sort of “robustness” operator (we’ll take up the precise interpretation of this 
operator shortly). However, ϕ’s being an SPC kind in this sense does not do justice to the inference 
pattern mentioned in §4, where the observation that j has P, Q, R gives us good reason for expecting 
that j has S and T as well. What we want out of clusters is not mere “sociability”—that once a cluster 
of properties are together instantiated, they are hard to scatter —, but cliquishness. Peg, Quinn, 
Ralph, Sarah, and Tim form a clique, say. Spotting Peg, Quinn, and Ralph at the mall means that 
Sarah and Tim are probably there as well. Nothing is implied about how long they’ll stay. Perhaps 
they flit from place to place, but when a few of them are around, you can bet that the others will be 
as well. 
 Call this conception of stability cliquish stability.28 This is a rather more “abstract” variety of 
stability: a cluster of properties can be cliquishly-stable without its being instance-stable. The idea is 
to capture the fact that some properties are clustered in such a way that possession of some of them 
reliably (if imperfectly) indicates the possession of whole cluster (if not each property in the cluster) 
at that time. It need not imply that a particular that possesses any of these properties will continue to 
possess them. 
 To be more precise about this, it will be convenient to introduce another somewhat imprecisely 
defined notion: a “sub-cluster”. Consider again our property cluster [ϕ] (that is, [P, Q, R, S, T]). Let 
a sub-cluster of [ϕ] include some but not all of the properties in [ϕ]. ‘Some’ here is meant to be 
interpreted not as the familiar existential quantifier of first-order logic, but according to its more 
familiar colloquial usage: as an indefinitely-plural quantifier (as when I tell you that “some 
philosophers got inebriated at the Smoker” to assure you that you were not alone). [P, R, T] would 
thus be a sub-cluster of [ϕ]; as would [Q, R], and so on. For convenience, assign arbitrary names to 
these sub-clusters by simply subscripting [ϕ]: [ϕ1], [ϕ2], [ϕ3], and so on. Now let us say that a 
property cluster [ϕ] is cliquishly-stable when for all x and for many sub-clusters [ϕ1], [ϕ2], [ϕ3],…: 
■(([ϕ1]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ ([ϕ2]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ ([ϕ3]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ . . . ) 
                                                
28 I am tempted to call this ‘Matthew Stability’, after the bit in the New Testament (at Matthew 18:20) where Jesus 
promises that where two or three gather together as his followers, he is there among them. But that hits a bit too close to 
home (nominally-speaking). 
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where the ‘⇒’ is to be read as probabilistic entailment.29 And again we have the “black box” of 
robustness. What to say about this?  
 The option I’d like to explore here takes its cue from Marc Lange’s treatment of laws as members 
of a certain type of stable set.30 The basic idea is that certain sets of truths are maximally invariant 
under counterfactual perturbations. We can express this property of sets this way: Given any 
counterfactual supposition consistent with the members of the set, had that supposition been the 
case, then all the members of the set would still have been the case; and ditto for an arbitrarily nested 
sequence of counterfactual suppositions: had anything at all compatible with the set been the case, 
then had anything else compatible with the set been the case, (and so on), then the members of the 
set would still have been true. Lange calls this special kind of stability “non-nomic stability” (for 
extensive discussion, see Lange [2000], [2009]). Take some logically-closed set of truths Γ. This set 
possesses non-nomic stability if and only if for each member m of Γ: 
p □→ m, 
q □→(p □→ m), 
r □→(q □→ (p □→ m)), . . .  
for any non-nomic claims p, q, r, … which are logically consistent with the members of Γ.31 Lange 
conjectures that the set of laws is the only non-trivially non-nomically stable set. This affords a sharp 
distinction between the facts which are laws and those which are accidents.  
 However, Lange allows that there are different sets which are stable on more restrictive ranges of 
counterfactual suppositions. This is particularly useful for thinking about the biological sciences. 
Some biological generalizations, though they clearly could have been false, possess a significant 
degree of stability in the face of these more restrictive ranges counterfactual suppositions. Consider 
an example. Lange mentions the belief among anthropologists that “any person of entirely Native-
American heritage is blood type O or blood type A” ([2000], p. 13). Though a historical accident—
“research has suggested that all Native Americans are descended from a very small band that crossed 
                                                
29 Such entailment, of course, comes in degrees and can be understood in different ways. I will suggest in §6 that 
different sciences may set their own tolerances for what counts as sufficiently probable connections between sub-clusters 
and whole clusters in the definition of cliquish stability. Thanks to Rachel Briggs for helping me think about this. 
30 There are other ways of thinking about stability, of course, which bear interesting relations to Lange’s; see, e.g., 
(Mitchell [2000]), (Mitchell [2002]), (Woodward [2001]), and references therein. 
31 In Lange’s ([2009]) treatment of laws, he reformulates slightly the notion of “non-nomic stability” described in his 
([2000]) by using “might” rather than “would” counterfactuals, resulting in a stronger version of stability (which he calls 
“sub-nomic stability” in the later work). In the later definition, counterfactuals of the form ‘p □→ m’ are replaced by 
those of the form ‘~(p □→ ~m)’ (“it’s not the case that if p were true, m might not be true”). The revised formulation of 
stability is stronger, in that ‘~(p □→ ~m)’ implies ‘p □→ m’ but not vice versa; see Lange ([2009], p. 29) and notes 
thereabouts for discussion. To simplify matters (and to cohere with Lange’s pre-2009 discussions of laws), my discussion 
will ignore his post-2009 elaborations on stability. 
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the Siberia-Alaska land bridge, and as it happened, allele B was not represented in that company” 
(ibid.) —, that accident features a broad range of counterfactual stability. It would still be the case 
had a very wide array of facts been different. To repurpose another of Lange’s examples ([2004], p. 
106), doctors might report that a certain Native-American patient would still have gone into 
anaphylactic shock if the transfusion of type B blood had been administered sooner, or administered 
along with a different concentration of saline, or what have you. Of course, the blood type 
generalization might not still have be true had, say, the winter of 10,273 BCE been slightly warmer. 
The point is that if you are an emergency room doctor, the blood type generalization is stable 
enough for you to rely on; for it is unlikely that you would be very interested in counterfactuals 
involving the weather twelve thousand years ago. What matters to you is what manipulations in the 
here and now might save your patient. 
 Lange suggests we think of such restrictions of the range of counterfactuals under which certain 
generalizations are stable as being defined by the “interests” of the relevant special sciences. Change 
the above example slightly; Lange claims that 
it is of medical interest to know whether a given heart attack might have been less 
serious had epinephrine been administered sooner, or had the patient long been 
engaged in a vigorous exercise regimen, or had she been wearing a red shirt, or had 
the Moon been waxing. But it is not of medical interest to know whether the heart 
attack might have been less serious had human beings evolved under some different 
selection pressure. A physician might blame a patient’s untimely death on her 
smoking, but not on human evolutionary history. (Lange [2004], p. 107) 
While I am sympathetic to this basic idea—there are clearly some counterfactual antecedents which 
are of perennial interest to certain fields and many more others which are not —, there are some 
pressing concerns about the details of how interests apportion modal space. But let’s set these aside 
for the moment and look at how to adapt Lange’s basic conception of non-nomic stability to the 
SPC view of kinds.  
 Suppose we understand the black box in the above definition of cliquish stability in a broadly 
Langian way: that a property cluster [ϕ] is cliquishly-stable when for all x and for many sub-clusters 
[ϕ1], [ϕ2], [ϕ3], . . . .: 
p □→ (([ϕ1]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ ([ϕ2]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ ([ϕ3]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ . . . ), 
q □→(p □→ (([ϕ1]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ ([ϕ2]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ ([ϕ3]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ . . . ), 
r □→(q □→ (p □→ (([ϕ1]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ ([ϕ2]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ ([ϕ3]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ . . . ), . . .  
where p, q, r, . . . meet the following conditions: 
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(a) They are consistent with the probabilistic entailment relationships from sub-
clusters to clusters; 
(b) They are consistent with the natural laws (i.e., no counterlegals); 
(c) They meet the relevant applicability standards. 
The justification of conditions (a) and (b) is fairly straightforward: (a) is isomorphic to Lange’s 
requirements for p, q, r, . . . in his definition of non-nomic stability. We cannot expect some fact to 
be stable on the assumption of its negation: this would be tantamount in this case to insisting that 
something remain a natural kind even if it failed to be a natural kind! The justification of (b) is 
likewise parasitic on Lange’s construction. It assumes that the laws are at least partly responsible for 
facts about the relationships among a cluster’s properties.32  
 Condition (c) is the interesting—because open-ended—condition. Here we apparently return to 
the worries about Lange’s invocation of the interests of certain special sciences. One worry is that if 
interests play a significant role in the definition of stability, then we immediately foreclose on the 
“naturalness” of a system of natural kinds defined in these terms. We hearken back to Craver’s worry 
about interests playing too significant a role in mechanism-individuation in the HPC account.  
 Relatedly, we might wonder what defines a discipline’s interests. Is it even credible that 
disciplines single out (explicitly or implicitly) certain ranges of counterfactual antecedents for 
consideration of whether certain other facts would remain true on their supposition? Prima facie, it 
seems far easier to make sense of certain counterfactual antecedents not being of interest to a 
particular discipline. Were you to ask one of the doctors whether she was interested in whether the 
heart attack would still have been as severe if the humans had followed a different evolutionary 
trajectory, the answer surely would be “no”. But asking the doctor whether she is interested in what 
the scenario would have been like under different fashion or lunar conditions doesn’t seem likely to 
elicit a different response. One might claim that the reason our doctor won’t admit to being 
interested in the phase of the moon is that she already knows (or judges with a high confidence) that 
the moon’s phase has (practically) nothing to do with her patient’s heart condition. Perhaps this is 
enough to qualify the moon’s phase as of medical interest. This strikes me as a rather odd thing to 
say. 
 I prefer to think of condition (c) as being defined in terms of “relevance” rather than interests. 
Interests do play a role in determining which counterfactuals are relevant to the evaluation of 
cliquish stability, but only in a roundabout way. To illustrate, consider an example. Medicine is 
                                                
32 Actually, (b) is stronger than we really need, since there will be some counterlegals on which certain cluster 
relationships continue to hold. But this overkill affords some simplicity and does no harm that I can see. I am also not 
sure how to make it weaker without making it too weak. We should not, for example, insist that the p, q, r, … be 
consistent with all the facts of the form ‘[ϕ]x’, because cliquish stability does not presume that individuals are necessarily 
members of a certain kind. I leave this as an open question.
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interested in saving lives, let’s say. The inferential and explanatory work of the medical sciences 
pursues this goal in part by focusing on circumstances that are within our power to control: hence 
the relevance to medical practice of the counterfactual suppositions involving different amounts of 
drugs, exercise, or time in the ambulance; and hence the irrelevance of suppositions involving 
evolutionary contingencies or circumstances likely to bear on them. It is not simply that such “frozen 
accidents” are without our power to change—for nor is it within our power to change how long a 
certain patient spent in an ambulance once they are at the hospital. Rather, the accidents of 
evolutionary history are not similar in informative ways to circumstances which are manipulable. In 
contrast, reflecting on whether a certain patient would have lived had he arrived at the hospital 
sooner, is potentially instructive for future cases. This is why shirt color and lunar phase are also 
relevant (in the present sense) to medical concerns. They are circumstances which are similar to 
those we can either manipulate (shirt color) or at least be sensitive to (lunar phase). 
 This is not, of course, to suggest that “manipulability” will be what restricts the range of 
counterfactual suppositions we consider in assessing cliquish stability. Consider a particular species 
taxon whose members possess a characteristic cluster of properties. Biological inquiries that concern 
reasonably short timescale interactions—e.g., those of ecology—will rightly regard counterfactual 
suppositions involving the remote evolutionary past as irrelevant—but not simply because we cannot 
manipulate what went on millions of years ago (or relevantly similar states of affairs). For once again, 
it need not be within our power to manipulate conditions that almost certainly will be relevant to 
ecological concerns (such as the rise and fall of a predator’s population). Why, then, consider this 
counterfactual in assessing the cliquish stability of the property cluster associated with our taxon? In 
this case, it seems to me that the simplest thing to say is that we can expect such circumstances to 
eventually come to pass and that in order for our kind to bear any epistemic fruit in the contexts and 
timeframes with which we are concerned, the cluster ought to be largely insensitive to those 
changes.33 
 Property clusters which are cliquishly-stable for a given science, project, research program, or 
what have you, offer certain fixed points for those inquiries in the sense that for possible 
manipulations relevant to those pursuits, we may count on finding the clustered properties together, 
where we find some of them. So possibly, some clusters are only natural kinds for particular domains 
of inquiry. This result parallels Lange’s treatment of special science laws—though it is not 
uncontroversial for this reason. In particular, one might worry that this would squash any hope of 
the SPC account offering support for the Realist Presumption that many of our categories “carve 
nature at its joints”. 
                                                
33 My descriptions of these examples are necessarily schematic and tentative. The question of how disciplinary norms (of 
classificatory and investigative methodology) inform how a science assesses what natural kinds exist is complex and 
remains wide open. This is a matter I am presently pursuing by examining a number of case studies across the biological 
sciences; see my ([2013]), ([2014]), and ([manuscript]). 
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 Before examining this issue (in the final section), I wish to address two natural worries about 
shifting our theoretical focus to stability over mechanisms and essences. First, won’t any theoretical 
unification at the epistemic front come with a semantic cost? Probably; I tend to doubt that the SPC 
account will able to generate (without supplementation) any claims about how reference to natural 
kinds works. It may simply be that the semantics of natural kind terms may not exhibit much 
theoretical unity. Given the gain of genuine theoretical unity elsewhere, this is a potential cost I am 
willing to pay.  
 Second, does not the identification of homeostatic mechanisms or microstructural essences contribute 
to the accommodation demands of our best sciences? Wouldn’t adopting the SPC account be tantamount to 
renouncing these epistemic benefits?34 I do not think so. We can grant that the project of uncovering 
certain homeostatic mechanisms underlying the stability of some properties can contribute to the 
construction of epistemically fruitful classification schemes without supposing that such 
identification is necessary or that the mechanisms should be part of the philosophical analysis of 
natural kinds.  
 Putting stability at the ground level of an account of a natural kinds offers an attractive level of 
metaphysical neutrality. It turns out that we can say much about stability—indeed, more than what 
has so far been said about HPC’s causal mechanisms—without being forced to engage in 
controversial metaphysics. But the SPC analysis need not constrain scientific practice in any 
substantive way. Uncovering facts about an essential microstructural property (if such there be), or 
homeostatic mechanism, or ensemble of thereof, may well be an important part of our determining 
whether some properties are stable.35  
 
6 Interests and Realism about SPC Kinds 
We now turn to what is likely to seem the most controversial part of the SPC account of natural 
kinds. SPC kinds can be, as I will put it, “domain-relative” in several senses.36 First, there is the 
question of how many properties are expected to be clustered together for something to count as a 
kind. Second, the norms and aims of certain domains may require different levels of cluster 
cohesiveness—that is, different disciplines may tolerate different degrees of flexibility in the 
clustering required by their respective kinds (see Wilson [2005], p. 113). Perhaps property clusters 
defining physical kinds like electrons or quarks are supposed by those disciplines to be perfectly 
                                                
34 I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this second worry. 
35 When we look at how the investigation into such homeostatic mechanisms works, we see, I believe, much more than 
the a mere check on their existence (even as concerns only the identification of projectible categories). This is a subject I 
aim to address in future work. 
36 My comments here share some obvious overlap with those of Boyd (1999, 148), though I try to go a bit further than 
he does there. 
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clustered (conjunctive) kinds while those of higher biological taxa like families may be quite loose.37 
A third, closely related, sense in which cluster kinds can be domain-relative is in how the 
probabilistic entailment relations described in §5.2 are understood: how likely is it that the 
instantiation of a certain sub-cluster betokens the instantiation of the whole cluster? Fourth, we have 
the interest-informed relevance condition (c) above circumscribing how we think of a cluster’s 
stability. Since a particular cluster of properties can meet the requisite conditions for one domain but 
fail to meet them in another, we may allow that at least some collections of things only instantiate 
natural kinds from the perspective of particular sciences, or to pick a more neutral term: domains.38 
But if some kinds are domain-relative, the question of what kinds there are tout court is not generally 
tractable. What we can legitimately ask instead is what kinds various domains of inquiry in fact 
recognize (or would recognize) given their present aims, interests, and norms. 
 A different relativity about natural kinds may attach to certain physical contexts: call this context-
relativity. The point can be easily made using the language of homeostatic mechanisms, but applies 
mutatis mutandis to SPC kinds. If certain mechanisms only successfully maintain the stability of a 
cluster in particular contexts, then such clusters fail to be natural kinds unless relativized to those 
contexts. Of course, contexts where the properties in the cluster typically go uninstantiated anyway 
will not generate this effect. Remember: we are not talking about instance-stability. Many particulars 
of a kind lose their properties in some circumstances (e.g., a protein denatures outside of its usual 
temperature range, a cell ceases its characteristic functioning, and so on). The context-sensitivity at 
issue here is a more subtle affair: where the property cluster may continue to be instantiated, though 
the mechanism(s) maintaining its stability no longer function. For example, the cluster of properties 
defining certain cell types may only be stable when considered in vivo (rather than in a Petri dish, 
say).  
 An HPCer might respond to my objections from §4.1 (concerning the sufficiency of 
homeostatic mechanisms to stabilize a cluster of properties) that the work context-relativation does 
in the SPC account can equally be applied in the HPC account, effectively defeating that objection. 
If it works for me, shouldn’t it also work for them?39 Perhaps so; but what is being contextually-
relativized? Not, presumably, the simple existence of a homeostatic mechanism—for this would be 
transparently ad hoc. Perhaps the existence of a sufficiently stable homeostatic mechanism (for the 
relevant discipline’s norms and interests)? In this case, the HPC account seems to be just converging 
                                                
37 I conjecture that these two requirements tend to be “inversely proportional” in the sense that sciences which demand 
fewer properties to count as a cluster (like physics) tend to require their clustering to be more perfect; biological sciences, 
on the other hand, tend to countenance (if not require) more properties to be included in a cluster but allow their 
clustering to be rather more imperfect. 
38 Thinking about the present relativity in terms of domains rather than in terms of, say, particular branches of the 
special science allows us to recognize in addition to them: (1) non-scientific domains of inquiry where particular clusters 
may count as natural kinds, (2) domains which are internal to individual special sciences (particular research programs, 
lines of inquiry, &c.), or (3) assemblages of various special sciences. 
39 I’m again indebted to an anonymous referee for raising this objection. 
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on the SPC account. But look: this needn’t be a competition. The SPC account is, in my view, a 
refocusing on a phenomenon that has been implicitly recognized by HPCers all along. I am hopeful 
that they will see such theoretical convergence—and compatibility with the scientific focus on 
mechanisms of particular kinds—as reason to join me in exploring the concepts, applications, and 
consequences of the SPC account in more detail.  
 I will close this discussion by briefly considering one a consequence of the SPC account on our 
thinking about natural kinds as an ontological category. Allowing the interests and norms of a 
domain—even a particular research project—to influence whether a certain category counts as a 
natural kind might seem like a hefty dose of pragmatism to swallow. While some may applaud this, 
many with a sympathy for the Realist Presumption will worry. A theory of natural kinds, they might 
insist, should tell us about the objective divisions in the world that pre-exist our classificatory 
activities. Otherwise, we cannot make sense of some theories doing better than others at “carving 
nature” nor how certain schemes of classification can be in error.  
 I appreciate the worry, but ultimately think it is overstated. Though there’s a sense in which we 
cannot be mistaken about what norms and interests to adopt concerning certain classifications (I 
suppose that such norms are not truth-apt), I think we can come to see ourselves as having gone 
wrong in adopting them. Perhaps we held them in the first place due to some genuine mistake 
(taking some putative homogenizing effect to be more important than it actually is, for example). Of 
course, we certainly can be mistaken about whether a certain category is associated with properties 
that stably cluster given certain norms and interests (assuming that there are facts about property 
instantiations and what subjunctive claims which are true independently of us). But there are other 
ways of evaluating our norms. We may, for example, find that failing to relativize the evaluation of a 
certain cluster’s stability is unfruitful—for example, by foreclosing on certain makeable inference 
that would otherwise stem from recognizing a category as a context-relative kind. This, of course, 
presumes the existence of other “meta-norms”. 
 So while a domain’s norms and interests are relevant to what natural kinds there are, it’s not the 
case that we can arbitrarily “define nature’s joints into existence”. Nor do natural kinds await our 
classificatory activity in order to come into being. For the norms and interests relevant to a cluster’s 
stability often pre-exist those activities. They do not, however, pre-exist us.40 Thus a critic might 
point out that there is no live sense in which the SPC account is a realist account of natural kinds—
for it seems that there is no sense in which there were SPC kinds before science came on the scene a 
few thousand (or a few hundred) years ago. But surely there were different natural kinds of things! 
 I think that there are two compelling things to say in response. First, it is not clear to me that we 
should be aiming for a realist conception of natural kinds to begin with. I put a higher priority on 
maintaining some of the key realist intuitions about classification—that we can be in some sense 
                                                
40 Except, perhaps, in an attenuated sense of being possible ways of arranging scientific (or other) inquiries. Thanks to 
Marc Lange for raising this possibility. 
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mistaken about our systems of classification, that we can classify things in better and worse ways, 
that our best classification schemes can contribute in familiar ways to our inductive and explanatory 
efforts, and so on.  
 Second, one may hold out for a sense in which certain special categories—electrons, say—are 
natural kinds in a norm-neutral way. I think I can assent to the spirit of such a request, if not the 
letter, with minimal retraction of what I’ve been pressing by (so to say) crossing Mill with Whewell. 
Recall Whewell’s ([1840]) much cited idea about the naturalness of a system of classification 
stemming from the convergence of different systems of classification on the same categories. Though 
neat, this idea won’t help us make sense of electrons having discipline-independent objectivity, since 
the non-physical sciences (for the most part) do not have a great deal of explicit truck with 
fundamental particles. Here, however, we might invoke another nifty idea from John Stuart Mill 
([1872]) about objects as “permanent possibilities of sensation”. Perhaps there are some clusters of 
properties such that no matter how a discipline adjusted its norms and aims (compatible with the 
discipline maintaining an understanding of the natural world in view), the category that cluster 
described would be fit to play a robust epistemic role in the discipline. We might say that such 
categories exhibit a “permanent possibility of Whewellian convergence”. This allows us to see that 
the pluralism resulting from the SPC account’s domain- and context-relativity need not extend to all 
kinds.  
 While this goes some ways toward accommodating realist intuitions, I readily admit that the 
SPC account exhibits some distinctly non-realist features. The context- and discipline-relativity of 
some kinds show, I think, that natural kinds (on the SPC view) are not an ontological category (cf. 
Lowe [2006]). Nor is it obvious how they could be reducible to facts in other ontological 
categories—to universals, for instance. Against this idea, Bird suggests that: 
a simple reduction of kinds to combinations of universals is available along the lines 
proposed by Armstrong. Not all kinds can be dealt with so easily, for example those 
in biology. Nonetheless, the strategy can be extended, by considering kinds as 
homeostatic property clusters. Although Boyd does not see that latter in ontological 
terms, we can construe them as sums of properties, just as complex particulars are the 
sums of their component parts. (Bird [2012], p. 103)  
Yet treating a cluster of properties as a conjunction trades away what is arguably most distinctive 
about the approach: its looseness and corresponding ability to accommodate the messy patterns of 
biological variation and similarity. The conjunctive approach is far too strong.41  
                                                
41 Richards makes essentially the opposite mistake by understanding property cluster accounts of kinds as disjunctions of 
properties: “essences [on the HPC view] are a disjunction” ([2010], p. 154). This approach is inappropriately weak. 
Suppose we take a kind K as being defined as being P ∨ Q ∨ R. Two individuals could possess this disjunctive property 
while sharing no single property in common. Disjunctive similarity is dirt cheap. The cluster approach requires more. 
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 What, then, are SPC kinds if not conjunctions of universals? Rather than recognize a sui generis 
ontological category—of clusters, say —, I prefer to think of being a natural kind as a sort of status 
that things or pluralities of things (from various ontological categories) can have.42 This “natural 
kindness” is understandably treated as a fixed, objective matter when it is highly insensitive to the 
whims of our classificatory norms and practices. But I suspect that the tendency to nominalization of 
what is potentially a domain- and context-relative status has sent us down some blind alleys. What 
the SPC account offers us is a flexible, high-level approach to understanding the various ways in 
which various categories (scientific and otherwise) can be regarded as genuine features of the world 
in organizing and facilitating our epistemic contact with the world. They are genuine features of the 
world for the relevant domains. 
 Clearly many questions about the approach remain. I will close by mentioning two that stand 
out as especially urgent. First, how in detail should the intuitions that SPC kinds are 
“genuine”/“real” features of the world be squared with the various sorts of relativity I mentioned 
above? Second, how should we understand the metaphysics (and epistemology) of cliquish stability 
(even from within a particular context)? Should we also follow Lange to primitivism about 
subjunctives or propose some different account of what makes subjunctives true?43 I would prefer to 
not take a stance about this difficult question, elevating the concept of cliquish stability to a high-
enough theoretical level to avoid the fray below (in something like the manner of Lange [2005b]), 
but doing so may be unavoidable. 
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